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FOREWORD-QUIESCENCE AND FERMENT: THE 1974 TERM IN
THE SUPREME COURT
FRANCIS A. ALLEN*

The October Term, 1974, was not a vintage year
for those who follow the work of the Supreme Court
through its criminal cases. It is not easy to overcome
a sense of anticlimax produced by the Court's
postponement until next term of its decisions in the
death penalty cases. I When decided, those cases will
almost necessarily constitute a highly significant
chapter in our constitutional history. This is true
because of the impact that any resolution of the
litigation will produce on the administration of
justice in this country, the sober issues of public
morality that are inescapably involved, and because
of the portentous questions presented concerning the
continuing role of the Supreme Court as a primary
source of our public policy.
Apart from the capital punishment cases, the
term's gruel was rather thin. The most interesting
case, Faretta v. California,' while important, is
probably less significant than any of a number of
constitutional adjudications handed down in recent
years. For some observers, no news from the Burger
Court is good news; and this is especially true in the
criminal area. It is, of course, not literally accurate to
describe the 1974 term as a period of "no news."
Some decisions of interest were decided, and a
number of characteristic tendencies of recent years
were again given clear expression. Startling innovations, however, were few; and this fact provides an
opportunity to scrutinize some aspects of the Court's
work that are sometimes overlooked in periods of
greater excitement.

ant to proceed at trial "without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so."' The
problems involved in this proposition are too difficult
and extensive to receive more than cursory examination in these comments. Despite the fact that the case
was decided six to three, with only three of the four
Nixon appointees in dissent, the opinion of the Court
delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart is unpersuasive
both in its analysis of the constitutional language and
in its effort to summon historical support for the
result." The holding, furthermore, is not easy to
reconcile with some recent adjudications of the
Court. Justice Stewart concedes:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an
accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against
the grain of the Court's decisions holding that the
Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted
and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right

to the assistance of counsel. '
Nor does the opinion deal satisfactorily with Singer
v. United States. ' In that case it was held that waiver
by the defendant of his right to trial by jury does not
result in a right to a bench trial unless the judge and
prosecutor also consent. "The ability to waive a
constitutional right," it was said, "does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist on the
opposite of that right." ' If so, may it follow that
31d. at 807.

4The Court argues, for example, that because the
language of the sixth amendment defines certain rights as
I.
being possessed by the accused, it follows that the power to
In the Farettacase the Court discovered implicit in assert them is likewise conferred personally on the accused
without intervention of counsel. Id. at 819. Mr. Justice
the Sixth Amendment a right of the criminal defend- Blackmun in dissent responds: "Although I believe the
specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of the accused, I do not agree that the Sixth Amendment
Michigan.
guarantees any particular procedural method of asserting
t
Fowler v. North Carolina, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d those rights." Id. at 848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
803, cert. granted,419 U.S. 963 (1974), restored to calen11d. at 832.
darforreargument,422 U.S.,1039 (1975).
6380
U.S. 24 (1965).
7
2422 U.S. 806 (1975).
1d. at 34-35.
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waiver of the right to counsel does not confer on the
defendant sole power to determine that he shall
conduct his defense without a lawyer? Singer seems
to cut strongly against the Faretta result, for the
Court has recognized representation by counsel to be
more vital to a fair hearing than jury trial.' Moreover, waiver of trial by jury ordinarily expedites
rather than burdens the administration of justice,
whereas the conduct of criminal defense by an
untutored accused can delay and obstruct the progress of the trial.
The decision of Faretta leaves open a series of
apprehensions and unanswered questions. Many of
these are articulated by Mr. Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion.' What must be shown to establish the fact of intentional and intelligent waiver of
counsel?"' And will trial and appellate courts give
the criteria fair application? Should or must a court
appoint "standby" counsel and thus accord the
defendant the advantages both of direct access to the
jury and the advice of counsel?" What powers do
courts possess to protect against disruptive and
obstructive behavior of the accused conducting his
defense?
Despite the difficulties and doubts created by the
Farettadecision, the result may well be defensible on
pragmatic grounds. On the one hand, the perils of an
untutored defense are sufficiently obvious even to the
untutored that fears of frequent refusals of assistance
by the criminally accused may be overdrawn. On the
other hand, there may be times in which the
defendant will be advantaged by refusal of counsel.
Given the persistent reluctance of the Court to open
the door to any meaningful scrutiny of the competence of representation afforded indigent defendants12 and the ordinarily rigid restrictions on the
power of such defendants to choose who will represent them at the trial, the alternative of pro se representation may not always be the worse of the
'See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
'Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 846.
"An empirical study published in the year that Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) was decided, may still
throw some light on the problems to be encountered. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1963). See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUsTICEPROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 7.2 (1968).
"ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL JuSTIcE-THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL

JUDGE § 6.7 (1972).
"E.g., Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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evils. There is some evidence that Faretta was
motivated less by a desire to represent himself than
by a wish to avoid being represented by the public
defender. "
There are more fundamental considerations, however. It is in the prosecution of "political" offenses
that the greatest problems of disruption may be
anticipated, but it is also in these cases that the
opportunity for self-representation may be of greatest
social utility. Reflections on the political trials of the
1960's suggest that one of the factors that most
exacerbates the alienation of defendants and those
sometimes substantial segments of the community
who identify with the accused, is the inability of
defendants to get before the tribunal any evidence
relating to the motives that induced them to confront
the law and to hazard their freedom. Although this
failure may be dictated by proper standards of legal
relevance, it contributes to frustration and to the bad
reputation of courts among the disaffected population, and may thus in the long run weaken fidelity to
the law."' There may perhaps be better ways to

relax this insulation of juries from knowledge of
defendants' motives than by granting the defendant
direct access to thejury in his own defense. Nevertheless, in the absence of such alternatives, the pro se
defense may in some instances reduce the sense of

injustice that is engendered by such proceedings.
Beyond these utilitarian considerations, however,
there is something attractive in a system willing to

pay the costs of permitting individuals, well advised
of the perils of their decisions, to confront the state
without intermediaries. Perhaps the right of persons
to stand alone against the state responds to the same
respect for individual autonomy that finds expression
in the privilege against self-incrimination. At the
close of his dissent, Mr. Justice Blackmun quotes the
old saw: "One who is his own lawyer has a fool for a
client." " The advice implicit in this folk wisdom
appeals to prudence and good sense. Yet the very
notion of liberty encompasses a power of choice,
which must mean, within very broad limits, the
power to select what others believe to be the foolish
rather than the wiser alternative. And so when Mr.
Justice Blackmun complains that the Court "now
bestows a constitutionalright on one to make a fool

of himself," " he appears unaware that this possibility is not unique to the right in question, but is a
3"Faretta

"F.

v. California, 422 U.S. at 807.

ALLEN, THE CRIMES OF POLITICS 60-63 (1974).

"422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"I1d.
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common characteristic of most constitutional liberties.
II.
For two generations the Supreme Court has been
perhaps our most important source of criminal
procedural law. What is very often overlooked,
however, is that the Court is also an important
source of the substantive law of crimes. Certainly this
is true of the federal criminal law, but in recent years
the Court has impinged on state law-making in this
area, as well. In general, this portion of the Court's
docket has attracted very little public attention,
certainly none to compare with the almost compulsive scrutiny that is given to the emerging law of
constitutional criminal procedure. At times, the
almost off-hand attitudes revealed by the Court in its
approach to important substantive issues suggests
that it, too, shares some of the public insouciance
toward the issues of crime definition. 11Perhaps these
attitudes reveal a general conviction in this country
that is is only questions of process and procedure that
"really matter." However that question is to be
resolved, a number of interesting and a few important cases presenting issues of substantive criminal
law were decided in the 1974 term. They deserve
attention, and provide an occasion for reflections on
the Court's role in this important field.
Perhaps the substantive area in which, over the
years, the Court's performance has been most dismal
is that relating to economic crimes and to other
statutory offenses in which the prosectuion appears
to have been wholly relieved of its obligations to
establish the intention, knowledge, or recklessness of
the accused or has at least been spared the full rigors
of proof of the mens rea. The Court's opinions in
these cases have often been unphilosophic, capricious, inadequately articulated, and lacking in sensitivity to the range of interests at stake." Last term's
"There are certain categories of "substantive" issues
toward which the Court has been anything but indifferent.
These are cases in which federal constitutional limations
are relied on to deny to government the power to designate
certain kinds of behavior as criminal. Examples are the
obscenity cases or cases involving alleged political subversion. While the issues involved can fairly be described as
"substantive" in character, the relevant law is the specialized law of the first amendment, not what one might
describe as general criminal law doctrine. The first amendment cases are, therefore, excluded from the generalizations
made in the text.
"Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 107; Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).

decision of United States v. Park19 presented a
problem arising under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.20 The corporation of which the defendant Park was president distributed contaminated
food in violation of the Act. No one suggested that
Park had directly caused the contamination or had
actual knowledge of the conditions that resulted in
contamination. He had simply delegated to subordinates the task of avoiding such threats to health, and
the latter had failed to achieve that result. Park was
charged with criminal violations, and after trial was
convicted.
American courts and legislatures have rarely
revealed adequate concern for the issues of justice
and expediency involved in imposing criminal sanctions on human defendants who lacked criminal
knowledge or purpose. This lack of concern is even
more disturbing when vicarious liability is involved;
when, that is, the defendant not only lacked the mens
rea, but also did not act to produce the forbidden
result. 21 It is common ground that corporations and
corporate employees should be held to very high
standards of care when handling food and drugs for
public consumption. Nonetheless, doctrines of strict
liability can result in the imposition of criminal
sanctions even when the satutes have succeeded in
inspiring conformity with high standards of care; for
adherence to the highest levels of prudence will not
always avoid harms to the public. Because legal
regulations can presumably inspire high standards of
care but cannot guarantee that harm will never
occur, it seems reasonable to urge that the person
accused should be permitted to defend against the
criminal charge on a showing that his behavior,
despite the unfortunate result, was fully consistent
with due care, however demanding the standard of
what is "due" may be. This seems consistent with
justice and common sense, 22 and is all the more
compelling when it is recalled that criminalpenalties
are not the only weapons available to legislatures
seeking to protect the public interest.21
U.S. 658 (1975).
U.S.C. § 331 (k) (1970). The same statute was involved in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943), a holding that has contributed little to clear throught
about
these issues.
21
19421

2021

G.

WILLIAMS,

CRIMINAL

LAw: THE GENERAL PART

285-86 (1953).
22
Such an approach has been worked out in the High
Court of Australia. See the opinion of Dixon, J., in
Proudman v. Dayman, 67 Commw. L.R. 536, 539 (Austl.
1941).
22
SeeJ. EDWARDS,

MENs

REA

IN STATUTORY OFFENCES

(1955); Allen, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 1120 (1957).
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ed, not only for violating the statute defining the
substantive offense, but also for a conspiracy to
the Court. "[T]he Act," he says, "in its criminal as- violate that section. The issue was whether, given the
pect does not require that which is objectively fact that the substantive offense necessarily involved
'
impossible." 24
Moreover, the opinion recognizes that concerted behavior, the defendants could be convicted
the corporate president is entitled to submit exculpa- of both the substantive offense and conspiracy. A
tory evidence, despite his ultimate responsibility for majority of the Court affirmed the convictions on
the corporation's affairs. But what is it that defend- both counts.
The case is treated by the Court merely as one of
ant must show? In approving the instruction given at
the trial, the Court retracted most of what it statutory interpretation. Only Mr. Justice Douglas
appeared to have conceded. The instruction would was disposed to elevate the principle of Wharton's
impose guilt if the corporate officer stood "in a Rule to the level of a constitutional limitation. "0Even
responsible relation to the situation." 25 But surely so, it could be argued that Congress legislated with
this is susceptible to interpretation that Park is liable knowledge of Wharton's Rule, and therefore without
simply by virtue of his corporate presidency. The expectation that the section in question could be used
Chief Justice grants that "it would have been better as a basis for both substantive and conspiracy
to give an instruction more precisely relating the prosecutions. Nor are Mr. Justice Powell's argulegal issues to the facts of the case," but concludes ments to the contrary entirely persuasive. Thus, his
that there was no "abuse of discretion." 2 It is explanation for the "five-person" requirement is that
difficult to escape the conclusion that Park was Congress, recognizing that the primary responsibility
entitled to a better run for his money than he received for enforcing gambling regulations is in the states,
at the hands of the federal courts. This is doubly desired to restrict federal intervention to gambling
1
unfortunate in an area in which guidance from the enterprises of significant size." That Congress was
Court has been weak and ambivalent, and in a case concerned with large rather than trivial manifestain which firm and principled direction would have tions of concerted behavior, however, does not in any
way reduce the resemblances between the statutory
been easy to supply.
When, considering the widespread public dissatis- crime and criminal conspiracy; and hence hardly
faction with the federal use of conspiracy prosecu- supports the truncated operation of Wharton's Rule
tions, the Supreme Court of the United States decides that the holding effects. The problem of statutory
a case that appears to weaken one of the very few interpretation is difficult, however, and it is by no
doctrines calculated to restrict the resort by prosecu- means clear that the majority opinion distorts contors to the conspiracy device, the holding is inevitably gressional intentions and expectations. The statof interest and concern. Such a case is Iannelli v. ute was enacted as part of a governmental campaign
United States,27 and the doctrine of limitation is against organized crime, and it may well reflect a
known as Wharton's Rule. The latter has been purpose of the sort attributed to Congress in an
defined as follows: "An agreement by two persons earlier case involving a different federal statute:
the determination of Congress to turn the screw
cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy when the crime "...
is of such a nature as to necessarily require the of the criminal machinery.., tighter and tighter." 32
28
participation of two persons for its commission." In The issue may thus be whether there are sufficient
Iannelli the offense involved does "necessarily re- indicia of such a purpose to justify the Court's
quire the participation of two persons for its commis- disregard of the ordinary canon requiring strict
sion," for the statute in question makes it a federal interpretation of criminal statutes. However proboffense to conduct a gambling business involving five lematic the issue of interpretation may be, there is
or more persons and which is illegal under state little realistic basis for the rather wistful hope
law. " The eight petitioners to the Supreme Court conveyed by Mr. Justice Powell in the last paragraph
and six other codefendants were indicted and convict"0"In my view the Double Jeopaidy Clause forbids
simulaneous
prosecution under §§ 1955 and 371. Whar24
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
ton's Rule in its original formulation was rooted in the
2SId.
double jeopardy concern of avoiding multiple prosecu2rId. at 675.
tions." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 792 (Douglas,
27420 U.S. 770 (1975).
J., 3dissenting).
1
281 R. ANDERSON, -WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
id. at 790.
32
Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Gore v.
PROCEDURE 191 (1957).
2918 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 (1958).
It is encouraging that none of the above is directly
disputed in Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for
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of the Court's opinion, where it is said: "[W]e do not
imply that the distinct nature of the crimes of
conspiracy to violate and violation of § 1955 should
prompt prosecutors to seek separate convictions in
every case ....
",. Judicial exhortations against
excessive resort to the conspiracy count have not been
effective in the past. There is no reason to think that
they will succeed here.
The most important decision in this group of cases
is Mullaney v. Wilbur. "' It is a surprising fact-that as
basic a proposition as the one requiring proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not squarely
stated to be part of the requirements of due process until the 1970 decision of In re Winship,35
and then in a case involving, not a criminal prosecution, but a delinquency proceeding in a juvenile
court. Even though the principle was widely repeated
long before the decision of Winship, its vitality was
often sapped by state rules, particularly those relating to such "affirmative defenses" as self-defense and
insanity, that place burdens of proof upon defendants
to establish the facts-upon which those defenses
rest." 6 Thus while courts spoke of the prosecutor's
burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
defendants were at the same time being required to
bear the onus of establishing contested facts pertinent
to the issue of the accused's guilt or nonguilt.
Mulaney v. Wilbur involves an anachronistic
feature of the law of Maine. Maine, as other courts of
the Anglo-American legal system have been doing for
some four centuries, reduces the grade of criminal
homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter in
cases of some killings committed in "heat of passion." What was distinctive about Maine law were
the principles that govern allocation of the burden of
proof of facts relevant to the mitigation from murder
to manslaughter. The theory of the Maine courts
appears to be that murder and manslaughter are
simply divisions of the same crime. Once the prosecution establishes that the killing was intentional, a
presumption arises that the killing is with malice
aforethought, which presumption prevails until the
defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that
he acted in a heat of passion upon sudden provocation. It was argued that the Winship principle does
not govern here because defendant's burden does not
arise until the prosecutor has established defendant
33

Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 791.

.4421

U.S. 684 (1975).

35397
6

U.S. 358 (1970).

" E.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Com-

monwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108
(1970).

to be guilty of some crime, and because defendant's
burden goes not to guilt, but only to the penalty to be
imposed.
Mr. Justice Powell for the Court quite properly

rejected the State's argument, and did so in terms
that also appear to threaten the validity of state rules
imposing burdens of proof on those who raise
self-defense or insanity pleas. In a curious and
obfuscatory concurring opinion, Mr. .Justice Rehnquist contends that the Court's holding does not
adversely affect the authority of Leland v. Oregon 37
in which the Court in 1952 refused to invalidate a
state statute that imposed a burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt on a defendant seeking to raise the
defense of insanity. 38 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The Court noted in Leland that the issue of insanity as
a defense to a criminal charge was considered by the
jury only after it had found that all elements of the
offense, including the mens rea if any required by state
law, had been proved beyond reasonable doubt....
Having once met that rigorous burden of proof that the
defendant not only killed a fellow human being, but
did it with malice aforethought, the State could ...
conclude that a defendant who sought to establish the
defense of insanity.., should bear the laboring oar on
[the insanity defense]."
Surely this is incoherent. In the hypothetical the

State does not establish that the killing was with
malice aforethought simply by introducing clear and
convincing proof that defendant killed intentionally."' An intended killing by one afflicted by in-

sanity is not a killing with malice aforethought,
for the whole point of the insanity defense is that an
intent formed by a mind suffering serious mental
disorder is not one that the law conceives of as
malice. Injustice Rehnquist's case all that the State
has done is to show that the killing is murder unless
unresolved questions about insanity have been introduced into the case; and the issue presented is
whether the burden is on the prosecution or defense
to resolve those questions. Essentially the same
question was presented by Wilbur, and it was
decided favorably for the defendant.
U.S. 790 (1952).
" The majority opinion makes only one non-committal
reference to Leland. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 705.
11421 U.S. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"Even if the State's nomenclature encompasses an
intentional killing by an insane person within its definition
of malice aforethought, the usage constitutes a verbal
convention. Such formalism should not be permitted to
achieve the functional consequence that Justice Rehnquist
champions.
37343
8
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There may, however, be situations in which the
broad rationale of Wilbur should be relaxed, although (it may be hoped) not in the way Justice
Rehnquist urges. In some situations the consequence
of forbidding the state to place a burden of proof on
the defendant may be to deny the defendant an
opportunity for exculpation that the legislature
might otherwise be willing to allow. Thus, in
"regulatory" offenses of the sort involved in the Park
case discussed above, the legislatures may be induced
to permit the defendant to escape liability by showing
that his behavior was consistent with due care, but
only if the defendant is required to assume the
burden of proving it. To deny legislative power to
place such a burden on the accused may simply result
in the legislature's imposing strict liability and
withholding defenses altogether. Obviously, the Wilbur case has not said the last word about these
problems.
The cases discussed in this section are examples of
one aspect of the Court's work in the criminal area
that receives comparatively little attention from
critics and commentators. 4 ' Yet these cases sometimes involve interests and values of considerable
importance, and their cumulative significance for the
decency and efficiency of the criminal process is very
great. They deserve greater consideration than they
customarily receive, and one suspects that the quality
of the Court's performance might be enhanced by a
more consistent critical scrutiny.
III.
In the course of his address at the Court's
memorial tribute to Earl Warren in May 1975, Mr.
Chief Justice Burger remarked:
Because criminal justice has such a high visibility and
affects so many people, and because of the reality that
thousands of years of effort by the human race has not
produced effective solutions, there is a sharp divergence of opinion as to the ways and means to
administer justice, even when there is a consensus on
objectives."

Some critics have no doubt even questioned whether
the majorities of the two Courts have shared a
"consensus of objectives." In short, published analyses of the Burger Court's work frequently take on
3
angry and apocalyptic tones.' Surveys of recent
Supreme Court opinions will almost invariably be
concerned, at least in part, with measuring the
degree of erosion that the new cases inflict upon the
edifice erected in the Warren years and with the
search for trends and portents.
For what it may be worth, the claims of a
substantial number of criminal defendants were
upheld in cases decided by the Court in the 1974
term. This was true in the important Faretta and
Wilbur cases already discussed. In Gerstein v.
Pugh"' the Court held that the fourth amendment
was violated when the defendant was denied a
probable cause hearing following a warrantless
arrest made pursuant to a criminal information filed
by the prosecutor. The majority made clear, however, that the hearing need not be an adversary
5
one.4
In Brown v. Illinois4 ' a defendant was arrested
illegally. Some two hours later and after receiving a
Miranda warning, he made an incriminating statement. In holding that the giving of the warning did
not per se "purge the taint" of the illegal arrest
within the meaning of Won g Sun v. United States,'47
the Court resolved what had theretofore been an
open question. Whatever the future of the Wong Sun
precedent in the Burger Court, the specific holding
in Brown seems correct. In United States v. Ortiz, 48
the Court extended the holding of the 1973 AlmeidaSanchez case4" to deny immigration officials the right
to search automobiles at established check points
without probable cause. In other cases, however, the
Court on the most unpersuasive of showings refused
to give retroactive effect to the Almeida-Sanchez
precedent," and authorized the stopping of cars to
ask questions when there is "reasonable suspicion,"" on the analogy of Terryv. Ohio. 52
Even when constitutional claims are upheld by the
3

Many observers of the Burger Court's performance in criminal cases have been painfully conscious
of the "sharp differences of opinion" that appear to
separate the present Court from its predecessor.
"Another interesting problem of statutory interpretation is presented in United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671
(1975). There the Court held that a federal statute
punishing assaults on federal officers does not require the
prosecution to prove that the accused knew that the person
assailed was a federal officer. The result seems highly
dubious.
'"421 U.S. xxvii (1975).
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Cf. L. W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 439 (1974): "The
lawyers who today constitute the majority of the Court in
most criminal-justice cases are no damn good as judges.
They are more like advocates for law enforcement's cause."
"4420 U.S. 103 (1975).
41Id. at 120, 123 (1975).
46422 U.S. 590 (1975).
4 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"-422 U.S. 891 (1975).
"Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
5
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
51 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.'873 (1975).
"392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1975]
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decision of the Court to the crisp technical grounds
supplied by the Fifth Amendment, Mr. ChiefJustice
Burger felt called upon to argue at length that the
Court's decision will not "diminish flexibility and
informality to the extent that those qualities relate
uniquely to the juvenile court system."" Even if one
makes the dubious assumption that "flexibility and
informality" are values to be pursued when the
juvenile court is confronted with the obligation of
determining whether the child did or did not commit
the delinquent act, are these values of the kind that
can be thought to qualify the clear and peremptory
requirements of the double jeopardy clause? If not, is
there not danger that such extraneous discussion may
weaken the force of the constitutional holding and
suggest qualifications neither intended nor desired?
The clearest indication that the Burger Court has
not changed its spots is provided by the cases
involving the exclusionary rule in the search and
seizure area. It did not require the opinions of the
1974 term to demonstrate that the exclusionary rule,
at least in the form approved in Mapp v.Ohio, 6'no
longer commands the support of a majority of the
Court. Last term's cases, nevertheless, provide abundant additional evidence. In Brown v. Illinois, as
already noted, the Court invalidated the evidential
But when a person under arrest is informed, as
use of an incriminating statement as the fruit of an
Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that
illegal arrest." Although the defendant prevailed in
anything he says may be used against him... it does
the instant case, the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun
not comport with due process to permit the prosecution
includes
the statement derived from United States v.
during the trial to call attention to his silence at the
Calandra62 that "the exclusionary rule has never
time of arrest and to insist that because he did not
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be
drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony. 56
persons." 63 In a footnote hardly pertinent to the
problem of the case Justice Blackmun asserts:
Another case displaying similar tendencies is "Members of the Court on occasion have indicated
Breed v. Jones" in which the Court quite correctly disenchantment with the rule.... Its efffcacT 'has
ruled that an adolescent who has been found by a been subject to some dispute." 4 Mr. Justice White
juvenile court in an adjudicatory proceeding to have concurred in the judgment on the ground that the
committed criminal acts cannot, consistently with the police "knew or should have known" that their
constitutional protections against double jeopardy, arrest of petitioner was without probable cause. 65 _
be tried later for the same acts in a criminal court.
It is in United States v. Peltier" that the dismanThe opinion of the Court is especially welcome tling of Mapp is most clearly exposed to public gaze.
because it weakens in some measure the impression The issue is whether the Almeida-Sanchez67 princicreated by the plurality opinion in the 1971 case of ple, denying to immigration officers constitutional
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania57 that the Court was
"Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 535 (1975).
prepared to drain all vitality from one of the
60367 U.S. 643 (1961).
principal achievements of the Warren Court, the
61422 U.S. 590 (1975).
decision of In re Gault. "Yet instead of confining the
62414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
Burger Court, the opinions are sometimes written in
such fashion as to create suspicions that the victories
are Pyrrhic ones. The opinions tend to be overargued, considerations of doubtful relevance are
"balanced," doubts never before entertained are
expressed about the future course of precedent. One
example of this tendency is United States v. Hale. -3
The issue was of no great complexity. At the trial the
judge permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the
defendant on the issue of why in the pre-trial
interrogation by the police and after defendant had
received a Miranda warning, he had not mentioned
the alibi he later advanced at trial or the incourt
explanation of his possession of a considerable sum of
money. Mr. Justice Marshall makes heavy work of
the opinion of the Court. His approach is illustrated
by the proposition: "We find the probative value of
respondent's pre-trial silence was outweighed by the
'4
prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence,"
To be sure, Justice Marshall's painful efforts to
weigh conflicting considerations permitted the Court
to avoid deciding a constitutional question. Yet
surely the assertion in Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion demonstrates how the case should have
been treated:

63422 U.S. at 600.

53422 U.S. 171 (1975).
"Id. at 173.
151d. at 182-83

64422 U.S. at 600 n.5 (1975).
65

56421 U.S. 519 (1975).
57403 U.S. 528 (1971).

67

58387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Id. at 606.

66422 U.S. 531 (1975).

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
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power to conduct searches of automobiles without
probable cause, is to be given retroactive effect. In a
five to four decision the Court through Mr. Justice
Rehnquist denied such effect and reinstated respondent's conviction. Almeida-Sanchez is categorized as
"new law," not because it upset any decision of the
Supreme Court, but because it overturned administrative rules and decisions of the courts of appeals.
But the opinion is of interest less because of its
manipulation of the "retroactivity" doctrine than because of what it says or implies about the nature of
the exclusionary rule. A year earlier in Michigan v.
Tucker, " the Court had remarked: "The deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct... . "" Although this proposition is scarcely as self-evident as the Court's
majority appears to believe it to be, there is an
additional objection that defenders of the Mapp
precedent are likely to advance. The rationale of
Mapp was not based solely on the presumed deterrent potential of the exclusionary rule, but on what
had earlier been described by Mr. Justice Stewart in
the Elkins case as the "imperative of judicial
integrity." ' Justice Rehnquist in Peltier moves to
recruit this latter notion to the cause of fundamental
modification of the exclusionary rule. Admittedly,
the argument employed "does not differ markedly
from the analysis" 7 the Court used in determining
that the deterrence rationale does not support retroactive application of new constitutional rules relating
to search and seizure. The position is that "if the law
enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith
that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial,
the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is not offended
by introduction into evidence" 72 of materials seized
by the police in ways that later were held to violate
the fourth amendment. But if this view of the "imperative of judicial integrity" provides no support
for retroactive application of exclusionary rules, does
it not equally suggest the non-applicability of the
exclusionary rule in any case in which the police
illegality was not willful? If this is to be the position
of the Court, there will be many who feel that Justice Rehnquist's version of the "imperative of judicial integrity" trivializes the concept. Undoubtedly, conscious wrongdoing by the police is a source
of aggravation. But even if the police were unaware
of the illegality, the judges are not. And it is the
68417 U.S. 433 (1974).
9
1d. at 447.
"°Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
" United states v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 538.
72Id. at 537.
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admission of evidence known by judges to have been
obtained in violation of constitutional right that gives
rise to the ethical concern expressed in the phrase,
the "imperative of judicial integrity."
It seems clear that the Court is moving, or has
already moved, to a view of the exclusionary rule that
would restrict its operations to situations in which
the police are found to have acted willfully or at least
negligently. 7' In the case of the police, it appears that
ignorance of the law is to become an excuse. The
difficulties of establishing the knowledge and purpose of the police, the likely tendency of the police
to risk more because of these difficulties, and questions about the will of many lower-court judges to
enforce the rules as intended, give rise to grave
doubts about the viability of the Court's new position. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan points out
in dissent, the new posture of the majority is more
radical than may at first appear. 74 What is under
attack is not only Mapp v. Ohio, but also Weeks v.
United States; 7 not only the exclusionary rule as
it has been enforced against the states since 1961,
but also the rule as understood in the federal courts
for over sixty years. This envolving history demontrates, if further proof is required, that the equating
of constitutional standards in state and federal courts
achieved by the Warren Court as a device to enlarge
individual rights, may also be employed for the more
effective contraction of those rights by a Court disposed to do so.
CONCLUSION

That the Burger Court, even in the criminal cases,
is a more complex phenomenon than often represented by its critics to be corroborated by a study of
the decisions of the 1974 term. There are few
either among the Court's supporters or detractors,
who would today describe it as a bench dedicated
to strict or literal interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, some of the most radical innovations in this century's judicial history have been
effected by the Burger Court-the abortion cases,7
Furman v. Georgia.'7 the modification of the re-

quirements both of size and of unanimity in the
constitutional definition of the criminal jury," con"'ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-

§ 290.2 (2), (3), (4) (1975).
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 551.
75232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6
7 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade,

DURE
4

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8
" Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970).
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stitute only a partial list of examples. It would border
on the fantastic to deny that the values given priority
by a majority of the present Court diverge drastically
from those expressed in the Warren years. Nonetheless, it is well to recall that many of the most
distinctive tendencies of the Burger Court had their
origins in the closing years of Earl Warren's tenure
when the country was oppressed by fear of the
possible collapse of public order. 79 That the Burger
Court frequently fails to reach acceptable levels of
craftsmanship, skimps the hard tasks of rational
persuasion, and is obsessed with achieving certain
79

These "origins" perhaps include: the "stop and frisk"
case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968); the failure of the
Court to maintain the exclusionary rule on a principled
basis; the failure to explore the implications of its holding in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); and the failure
to deal adequately with the "waiver" problem in formulating and administering the Miranda rule.

policy objectives, seems demonstrable. But these sins
were not invented by the Burger Court.
What our recent experience does again demonstrate is the danger of relying so heavily as we have in
the past upon the Supreme Court as the instrumentality to achieve efficiency and decency in the administration of American criminal justice. Many of those
most appalled by the six years of the Burger Court
have shirked the battle in the political and legislative
arena. However difficult the conflict may prove to be,
it is there that a large share of the effort must be
expended in the years immediately ahead. In the
meantime, the Burger Court should be criticized
vigorously when circumstances warrant. One hopes
that the criticism will be both rational and reasonably temperate, for extravagance of language can
threaten the long-term vitality of the institution. This
would be unfortunate, for we may need the Court
again some day.

